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Abstract
We give efficient protocols and matching accuracy lower bounds for frequency estimation in the local
model for differential privacy. In this model, individual users randomize their data themselves, sending
differentially private reports to an untrusted server that aggregates them.
We study protocols that produce a succinct histogram representation of the data. A succinct his-
togram is a list of the most frequent items in the data (often called “heavy hitters”) along with estimates
of their frequencies; the frequency of all other items is implicitly estimated as 0.
If there are n users whose items come from a universe of size d, our protocols run in time poly-
nomial in n and log(d). With high probability, they estimate the accuracy of every item up to error
O(
√
log(d)/(2n)). Moreover, we show that this much error is necessary, regardless of computational
efficiency, and even for the simple setting where only one item appears with significant frequency in the
data set.
Previous protocols (Mishra and Sandler, 2006; Hsu, Khanna and Roth, 2012) for this task either ran
in time Ω(d) or had much worse error (about 6
√
log(d)/(2n)), and the only known lower bound on error
was Ω(1/
√
n).
We also adapt a result of McGregor et al (2010) to the local setting. In a model with public coins, we
show that each user need only send 1 bit to the server. For all known local protocols (including ours),
the transformation preserves computational efficiency.
∗Computer Science and Engineering Department, The Pennsylvania State University. {bassily,asmith}@psu.edu
†Work done while A.S. was on sabbatical at Boston University and Harvard University.
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1 Introduction
Consider a software producer that wishes to gather statistics on how people use its software. If the software
handles sensitive information —for example, a browser for anonymous web surfing or a financial manage-
ment software—users may not want to share their data with the producer. A producer may not want to
collect the raw data either, lest they be subject to subpoena. How can the producer collect high-quality
aggregate information about users while providing guarantees to its users (and itself!) that it isn’t storing
user-specific information?
In the local model for private data analysis (also called the randomized response model1), each individual
user randomizes her data herself using a randomizer Qi to obtain a report (or “signal”) zi which she sends
to an untrusted server to be aggregated in to a summary s that can be used to answer queries about the data
(Figure 1). The server may provide public coins visible to all parties, but privacy guarantees depend only on
the randomness of the user’s local coins. The local model has been studied extensively because control of
private data remains in users’ hands.
Users
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Figure 1: The local model for private data analysis.
We focus on protocols that provide differential privacy [7] (or, equivalently in the local model, γ-
amplification [10] or FRAPP [1]).
Definition 1.1. We say that an algorithm Q : V → Z is (, δ)-local differentially private (or (, δ)-LDP),
if for any pair v, v′ ∈ V and any (measurable) subset S ⊆ Z , we have
Pr [Q(v) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr [Q(v′) ∈ S]+ δ.
The special case with δ = 0 is called pure -LDP.
We describe new protocols and lower bounds for frequency estimation and finding heavy hitters in the
local privacy model. Local differentially private protocols for frequency estimation are used in the Chrome
web browser (Erlingsson et al. [9], Fanti et al. [11]), and can be used as the basis of other estimation tasks
(see Mishra and Sandler [21], Dwork and Nissim [5]).
We also show a generic result for LDP protocols: in the public-coin setting, each user only needs to send
1 bit to the server.
Suppose that there are n users, and each user i holds a value vi in a universe of size d (labeled by integers
in [d] = {1, ..., d}). We wish to enable an analyst to estimate frequencies: f(v) = 1n#{i : vi = v} .
Following Hsu et al. [14], we look at summaries that provide two types of functionality:
• A frequency oracle, denoted FO, is a data structure together with an algorithm A that, for any v ∈ V ,
allows computing an estimate fˆ(v) = A(FO, v) of the frequency f(v).
1The term “randomized response” may refer either to the model or a specific protocol; we use “local model” to avoid ambiguity.
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The error of the oracle FO is the maximum over items v of |fˆ(v)−f(v)|. That is, we measure the `∞
error of the histogram estimate implicitly defined by fˆ . A protocol for generating frequency oracles
has error (η, β) if for all data sets, it produces an oracle with error η with probability at least 1− β.
• A succinct histogram, denoted S-Hist, is a data structure that provides a (short) list of items vˆ1, ..., vˆk,
called the heavy hitters, together with estimated frequencies (fˆ(vˆj) : j ∈ [k]). The frequencies of the
items not in the list are implicitly estimated as fˆ(v) = 0. As with the frequency oracle, we measure the
error of S-Hist by the `∞ distance between the estimated and true frequencies, maxv∈[d] |fˆ(v)−f(v)|.
If a data structure aims to provide error η, the list need never contain more than O(1/η) items (since
items with estimated frequencies below η may be omitted from the list, at the price of at most doubling
the error).
If we ignore computation, these two functionalities are equivalent since a succinct histogram defines a
frequency oracle directly and an analyst with a frequency oracle FO can query the oracle on all possible
items and retain only those with estimated frequencies above a threshold η (increasing the error by at most
η). However, when the universe size d is large (for example, if a user’s input is their browser’s home page
or a financial summary), succinct histograms are much more useful.
We say a protocol is efficient if it has computation time, communication and storage polynomial in n
and log(d) (the users’ input length). Prior to this work, efficient protocols for both tasks satisfied only (, δ)-
LDP for δ > 0. Efficient protocols for frequency oracles [21, 14] were known with worst-case expected
error O(
√
log(d) log(1/δ)
2n
), while the only protocols for succinct histograms [14] had much worse error —
about 6
√
log(d) log(1/δ)
2n
. Very recently, Fanti et al. [11] proposed a heuristic construction for which worst-case
bounds are not known. None of these protocols matched the best lower bound on accuracy, Ω(1/
√
n) [14].
1.1 Our Results
Efficient Local Protocols for Succinct Histograms with Optimal Error. We provide the first polynomial
time local (, 0)-differentially private protocol for succinct histograms that has worst-case errorO(
√
log(d)
2n
).
As we show, this error is optimal for local protocols (regardless of computation time). Furthermore, in the
public coin model, each participant sends only 1 bit to the server.
Previous constructions were either inefficient [21, 14] (taking time polynomial in d rather than log d), or
had much worse error guarantees2—at least Ω
(( log(d)
2n
)1/6). Furthermore, constructions with communica-
tion sublinear in d satisfied only (, δ) privacy for δ > 0.
Our construction consists of two main pieces. Our first protocol efficiently recovers a heavy hitter from
the input, given a promise that the heavy hitter is unique: that is, all players either have a particular value v
(initially unknown to the server) or a default value ⊥. The idea is to have each player send a highly noisy
version of an error-correcting encoding of their input; the server can then recover (the codeword for) v by
averaging all the received reports and decoding the resulting vector.
Our full protocol, which works for all inputs, uses ideas from the literature on low-space algorithms and
compressive sensing, e.g., [12]. Specifically, using random hashing, we can partition the universe of possible
items into bins in which there is likely to be only a single heavy hitter. Running many copies of the protocol
2Mishra and Sandler [21] state error bounds for a single query to the frequency oracle, assuming the query is determined before
the protocol is executed. Known frequency oracle constructions (both previous work and ours) achieve error O(
√
log(1/β)/n) in
that error model.
2
for unique heavy hitters in parallel, we can recover the list of heavy hitters. A careful analysis shows that
the cost to privacy is essentially the same as running only a single copy of the underlying protocol.
Along the way, we provide simpler and more private frequency-oracle protocols. Specifically, we show
that the “JL” protocol of Hsu et al. [14] can be made (, 0)-differentially private, and can be simplified to
use computations in much smaller dimension (roughly, O(n) instead of Ω(n4 log d)).
Lower Bounds on Error. We show that, regardless of computation time and communication, every local
(, δ)-DP protocol for frequency estimation has worst-case error Ω(
√
log(d)
2n
)) as long as δ  1/n. This
shows that our efficient protocols have optimal error.
The instances that give rise to this lower bound are simple: one particular item v (unknown to the
algorithm) appears with frequency η, while the remaining inputs are chosen uniformly at random from
[d]\{v}. The structure of these instances has several implications. First, our lower bounds apply equally well
to worst-case error (over data sets), and “minimax error” (worst-case error over distributions in estimating
the underlying distribution on data).
Second, the accuracy of frequency estimation protocols must depend on the universe size d in the local
model, even if one item appears much more frequently than all others. In contrast, in a centralized model,
there are (, δ)-differentially private protocols that achieve error independent of the universe size, assuming
only that there is a small gap (about log(1/δ)n ) between the frequencies of the heaviest and second-heaviest
hitters.
The proof of our lower bounds adapts (and simplifies) a framework developed by Duchi et al. [3] for
translating lower bounds on statistical estimation to the local privacy model. We make their framework more
modular, and show that it can be used to prove lower bounds for (, δ)-differentially private protocols for
0 < δ < 1/n (in its original instantiation, it applied only for δ = 0). One lemma, possibly of independent
interest, states that the mutual information between the input and output of a local protocol is at most
O(2 + δ log(d/δ)). In particular, the relaxation with δ > 0 does not allow one to circumvent information-
theoretic lower bounds unless δ is very large.
1-bit Protocols Suffice for Local Privacy. We show that a slight modification to the compression technique
of McGregor et al. [20, Theorem 14] yields the following: in a public coin model (where the server and
players have access to a common random string), every (, 0)-DP local protocol can be transformed so that
each user sends only a single bit to the server. Moreover, the transformation is efficient under the assumption
that one can efficiently compute conditional probabilities Q(y|x) for the randomizers in the protocol. To
our knowledge, all the local protocols in the literature (in particular, our efficient protocol for heavy hitters)
satisfy this extra computability condition.
The randomness of the public coins affects utility but not privacy in the transformed protocol; in partic-
ular, the coins may be generated by the untrusted server, by applying a pseudorandom function to the user’s
ID (if it is available), or by expanding a short seed sent by the user using a pseudorandom generator.
The transformation, following [20], is based on rejection sampling: the public coins are used to select
a random sample from a fixed distribution, and a player uses his input to decide whether or not the sample
should be kept (and used by the server) or ignored. This decision is transmitted as 1 bit to the server. Local
privacy ensures that the rejection sampling procedure accepts with sufficiently large probability (and leaks
little information about the input).
1.2 Other Related Work
In addition to the works mentioned so far on frequency estimation [21, 14, 9, 11], many papers have studied
the complexity of local private protocols for specific tasks.
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Most relevant here are the results of [15, 3] on learning and statistical estimation in the local model.
Kasiviswanathan et al. [15] showed that when data are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution, then every LDP
learning algorithm can be simulated in the statistical queries model [16]. In particular, they showed that
learning parity and related functions requires an exponential amount of data. Their simulation technique is
the inspiration for our communication reduction result.
Recently, Duchi et al. [3] studied a class of convex statistical estimation problems, giving tight (minimax-
optimal) error guarantees. One of the local randomizers developed in [3] was the basis for the “basic
randomizer” which is a building block for our protocols. Moreover, our lower bounds are based on the
information-theoretic framework they establish.
Finally, our efficient protocols are based on ideas from the large literature on streaming algorithms and
compressive sensing (as were the efficient protocols of Hsu et al. [14]). For example, the use of hash-
ing to isolate unique “heavy” items appears in the context of sparse approximations to a vector’s Fourier
representation [12] (and arguably that idea has roots in learning algorithms for Fourier coefficients such as
[18]). This provides further evidence of the close relationship between low-space algorithms and differential
privacy (see, e.g., [4, 8, 2, 17, 22]).
2 Building Blocks
2.1 Useful Tools
In this subsection, we will introduce some of the tools that we will use in our constructions.
First, we describe a basic randomizer (Algorithm 1) that will be used in our constructions as a tool to
ensure that each user generates an -differentially private report. This randomizer is a more concise version
of one of the randomizers in Duchi et al. [3].
Basic randomizer: Our basic randomizer R takes as input either an m-bit string represented by one of the
vertices of the hypercube {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m, or a special symbol represented by the all-zero m-length vector
0. The randomizer R picks a bit xj at random from the input string x (where j is the index of the chosen
bit), then it randomizes and scales xj to generate a bit zj ∈ {−c
√
m, c
√
m} (for some fixed c = O(1/)).
Finally,R outputs the pair (j, zj). As will become clear later in our constructions, the m-bit input ofR will
be a unique encoding of one of the items in V whereas the special symbol 0 will serve notational purposes
to describe a special situation in our constructions when a user sends no information about its item.
Theorem 2.1. R has the following properties:
1. R is -LDP for every choice of the index j
(that is, privacy depends only on the randomness in Step 3).
2. For every x ∈ {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m ∪ {0},R(x) is an unbiased estimator of x. That is, E [R(x)] = x.
3. R is computationally efficient (i.e.,R runs in O (m) time).
As noted in Step 6 of the algorithm, we view the output of R as a vector z ∈ Rm of the same length as
the input vector x. However, the output can be represented concisely by only dlogme + 1 bits (required to
describe the index j and zj).
In some settings, we may compress this output to just 1 bit. This comes from the fact that the privacy
of R holds no matter how the index j is chosen in Step 1, so long as it is independent of the input. (The
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Algorithm 1R: -Basic Randomizer
Input: m-bit string x ∈ {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m ∪ {0}, and the privacy parameter .
1: Sample j ← [m] uniformly at random.
2: if x 6= 0 then
3: Randomize j-th bit xj of the input x ∈ {− 1√m , 1√m}m as follows:
zj=
{
cmxj w.p. e

e+1
−cmxj w.p. 1e+1
where c = e
+1
e−1 = O
(
1

)
.
4: else
5: Generate a uniform bit: zj ← {−c
√
m, c
√
m}.
6: return z = (0, . . . , 0, zj , 0, . . . , 0) ∈ {−c
√
m, c
√
m}m where zj is in the j-th position of z. (This
output can be represented concisely by the pair (j, zj) using dlogme+ 1 bits).
randomness of j is important for utility since it helps ensure that E [R(x)] = x.) In particular, the random-
ness in the choice of j may come from outside the randomizer: it could be sent by the server, available as
public coins, or generated pseudorandomly from other information. In such situations, the server receives j
through other channels and we may represent the output using the single bit describing zj .
Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform: Next, we go over the well-known Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma that
will be used to efficiently construct a private frequency oracle. This idea was originally used to provide
an inefficient protocol for private estimation of heavy hitters in [14] (as opposed to providing just a private
frequency oracle).
Theorem 2.2 (Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma). Let 0 < c < 1 and d ∈ N. Let U be any set of t points in
Rd and let m ≥ 8 log(t)
c2
. There exists a linear map Φ : Rd → Rm such that Φ is approximately an isometric
embedding of U into Rm. Namely, for all x, y ∈ U , we have
(1− c)‖x− y‖22 ≤ ‖Φ(x− y)‖22 ≤ (1 + c)‖x− y‖22
|〈Φx,Φy〉 − 〈x,y〉| ≤ O (c (‖x‖22 + ‖y‖22))
Moreover, any random m × d matrix with entries drawn i.i.d. uniformly from {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
} enjoys this
property with probability at least 1 − β when m = O
(
log(t) log(1/β)
c2
)
. Note that in such case, this matrix
does not depend on the points in U (it only depends on the size of U).
Basic tools from coding theory: Finally, we review some basics from coding theory that we will use in our
efficient construction of private succinct histograms. For reasons that will become clear later, we will define
a binary code of block length m as a subset of {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m rather than {0, 1}m.
Definition 2.3 (A binary (2t,m, ζ)-code). A binary (2t,m, ζ)-code is a pair of mappings (Enc,Dec) where
Enc : {1, ..., 2t} → {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m such that the set of the resulting vectors in {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m, denoted by
C, satisfies the following constraint:
min
x,x′∈C
‖x− x′‖2 ≥ 2
√
ζ
equivalently, max
x,x′∈C
〈x,x′〉 ≤ 1− 2ζ
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and Dec : {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m → {1, ..., 2t} is some decoding rule that maps any given element in {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m
to one of the codewords of C.
The parameter ζ is known as the relative distance of the code. A binary (2t,m, ζ)-code can correct
up to ζ/2-fraction of errors. In other words, a binary (2t,m, ζ)-code has a decoder Dec such that for any
codeword x ∈ C and any erroneous version y ∈ {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m of x whose Hamming distance to x is less
than mζ/2, i.e.,
m∑
j=1
1(x(j) 6= y(j)) < mζ/2
(or equivalently, 〈x,y〉 > 1− ζ), we have Dec(y) = x.
Moreover, for any 0 < ζ < 1/2, there is a construction of a binary (2t, O(t), ζ)-code with an efficient
encoding and decoding algorithms. In fact, there are several constructions in coding theory literature that
satisfy this property (for example, see [13]).
2.2 A Private Frequency Oracle Construction
We give here an efficient construction of a private frequency oracle based on Johnson-Lindenstrauss pro-
jections. Our construction follows almost the same lines of the construction of [14]. Our version differs in
three respects. First, we use the construction only to provide a frequency oracle as opposed to identifying
and estimating the frequency of heavy hitters. For that purpose, the construction is computationally effi-
cient. The second difference is in the local randomization step at each user. Here, each user i ∈ [n] uses an
independent copy of the basic randomizerRi given by Algorithm 1 (as opposed to adding noise as in [14]).
This gives us pure -differential privacy guarantee (as opposed to (, δ) in [14]). The third difference is that
computations are carried out in much smaller dimension, namely O(n) as opposed to Ω(n4 log(d)) in [14].
Given our private frequency oracle, we give a simple efficient algorithm that, for any given input v ∈ V ,
uses the frequency oracle to obtain a private estimate fˆ(v) of the frequency f(v) of the item v.
Let Φ denote an m × d random projection matrix as in Theorem 2.2 with m = log(d+1) log(2/β)
γ2
and
γ =
√
log(2d/β)
2n
where β > 0 is an input parameter to our algorithm that, affects the confidence level of
our error guarantee (but not the privacy guarantee). In our protocol below, we assume the existence of a
source of randomness GenProj that on input integers m, d > 0 generates an instance of Φ. The output Φ
of GenProj is assumed to be public, that is, shared by all parties in the protocol (the users and the server).
We note that there are efficient constructions for GenProj that generates a succinct description of Φ that
is much less than md when the columns of the projection matrix Φ are k-wise independent for k << d.
For our construction, it suffices for the columns of Φ to be n-wise independent (namely, it will still satisfy
the conditions in Theorem 2.2). Hence, the amount of randomness generated by GenProj (describing Φ) is
O(mn) in such case.
We denote the i-th standard basis vector in Rd by ei. The construction protocol of a private frequency is
described below in Algorithm 2.
Note that m = O(n). Hence, the length of each user’s report is O(log(m)) = O(log(n)). Moreover, as
noted above we only need O(mn) = O(n2) random bits to generate Φ, thus, GenProj runs in time O(n2).
Also, each basic randomizer is efficient, i.e., runs in O(m) = O(n) time (Part 3 of Theorem 2.1). Hence,
one can easily verify that the construction is computationally efficient.
In Algorithm 3 below, we show that, for any given fixed item v ∈ V , FO can be used to efficiently give
an estimate fˆv of f(v).
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Algorithm 2 PROT-FO: -LDP Frequency Oracle Protocol
Input: Users’ inputs {vi ∈ V : i ∈ [n]}, the privacy parameter , and the confidence parameter β > 0.
1: γ ←
√
log(2d/β)
2n
.
2: m← log(d+1) log(2/β)
γ2
.
3: Φ← GenProj(m, d).
4: for Users i = 1 to n do
5: User i computes zi = Ri (Φevi , ).
6: User i sends zi to the server.
7: Server computes z¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi.
8: FO← (Φ, z¯) .
9: return FO
Algorithm 3 AFO: -LDP Frequency Estimator Based on FO
Input: Data structure FO = (Φ, z¯) (the frequency oracle), an item v ∈ V whose frequency to be estimated.
1: return fˆ(v) = 〈Φev, z¯〉.
The privacy and utility guarantees of the frequency oracle constructed by PROT-FO above are given in
the following theorems.
Theorem 2.4 (Privacy of FO). The construction of the frequency oracle FO given by Algorithm 2 is -
differentially private.
Proof. The proof follows directly from part 1 of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.5 (Error of FO). Let  > 0. For any set of users items {v1, ..., vn} and any β > 0, the error due
to FO constructed by Algorithm 2 is bounded as
ERR (f ; FO) , max
v∈V
|fˆ(v)− f(v)| = O
(
1

√
log(d/β)
n
)
with probability at least 1−β over the randomness of the projection Φ and the basic randomizersRi, i ∈ [n],
where fˆ(v) denote the output of Procedure AFO (given by Algorithm 3 above) on an input v.
Proof. The proof relies on the good concentration behavior of the inner product between the aggregate
measurement z¯ and any vector y ∈ {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m. This is formalized in the following claim.
Claim 2.6. Let β > 0. Let x1, . . . ,xn, by ∈ {− 1√m , 1√m}m and let zi = Ri(xi, ) where Ri, i ∈ [n] are
independent copies of our basic randomizer (Algorithm 1). Then, with probability at least 1− β, we have∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
〈zi − xi,y〉
∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
1

√
log(1/β)
n
)
.
To prove this claim, we first observe that 〈zi,y〉, i ∈ [n], is a sequence of independent random variables
taking values in
{−O (1 ) , O (1 )}. Also, from the second property of our basic randomizer (Theorem 2.1),
we have E [〈zi,y〉] = 〈xi,y〉. Putting these together, then by Hoeffding’s inequality our claim follows.
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To prove the theorem, observe that the error of construction FO can be written as
max
v∈V
|fˆ(v)− f(v)| = max
v∈V
∣∣∣∣∣〈z¯,Φev〉 − 〈 1n
n∑
i=1
evi , ev〉
∣∣∣∣∣
= max
v∈V
∣∣∣∣∣〈z¯− E[z¯],Φev〉+ 〈Φ
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
evi
)
,Φev〉 − 〈 1
n
n∑
i=1
evi , ev〉
∣∣∣∣∣ (1)
≤ max
v∈V
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
〈zi − E[zi],Φev〉
∣∣∣∣∣+ maxv∈V
∣∣∣∣∣〈Φ
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
evi
)
,Φev〉 − 〈 1
n
n∑
i=1
evi , ev〉
∣∣∣∣∣
(2)
where (1) follows from Part 2 of Theorem 2.1, and (2) follows from the linearity of the inner product and
the triangle inequality.
Now, by Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma (Theorem 2.2), with probability at least 1 − β/2, the second
term is bounded by γ · O(1) = O(1
√
log(d/β)
n ). We next consider the first term. Fix v ∈ V . By Claim 2.6
above, with probability at least 1− β2d , we have∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
〈zi − E[zi],Φev〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
1

√
log(d/β)
n
)
.
Hence, by the union bound, with probability at least 1−β/2, the first term of (2) is bounded byO
(
1

√
log(d/β)
n
)
.
Thus, with probability at least 1− β, the error of FO is bounded as in Theorem 2.5.
Note: The above upper bound is shown to be tight by our result in Section 5.
3 Efficient Error-Optimal Construction of Private Succinct Histograms
In this section, our goal is to construct an efficient private succinct histogram using the private frequency
oracle given in the previous subsection together with other tools. In Section 3.1, we first give a construction
for a simpler problem that we call the unique heavy hitter problem. Then, in Section 3.2, we give a reduction
from this problem to the general problem.
3.1 The Unique Heavy Hitter Problem
In the unique heavy hitter problem, we are given the promise that at least an η fraction of the n users hold
the same item v∗ for some v∗ ∈ V unknown to the server (here η is a parameter of the promise), and that all
other users hold a special symbol ⊥, representing “no item”.
Our goal is to obtain an efficient construction of a private succinct histogram under this promise, for as
small a value η as possible. We will take η to be at least C
√
log(d)
n for a universal constant C > 0. Our
protocol is differentially private on all inputs. Under the promise, with high probability, it outputs the correct
v∗ together with an estimate fˆ(v∗) of the frequency f(v∗).
The main idea of the protocol is to first encode user’s items with an error-correcting code and randomize
the resulting codeword before sending it to the server. The redundancy in the code allows the server learn
the unknown item v∗ from the noisy reports.
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We require an efficiently encodable and decodable binary (d,m, ζ)-code (of d codewords, block length
m, and relative distance ζ) where m = O(log(d)) with constant rate (so that m = O(log(d))) and constant
relative minimum distance ζ ∈ (0, 1/2), say ζ = 1/4. (We do not require the rate log dm or relative distance ζ
to be optimal; these quantities will affect the constants in the error of our construction but not the asymptotic
behavior.) There are several known constructions of such codes in the literature (see [13] for examples). Fix
one such code, denoted code(d,m, ζ), with associated encoder c and decoder Dec. The code is part of the
protocol and so is known to all parties. For convenience, we represent codewords as points in the unit-radius
hypercube {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m.
Each user i first encodes its item vi to obtain xi = c(vi) ∈ {− 1√m , 1√m}m, then runs the basic random-
izer Ri (given by Algorithm 1) on xi to obtain the report zi. Users that have no item, i.e., users with input
⊥, feed the zero vector xi = 0 to the basic randomizer.
The server aggregates the reports by computing z¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi, and then decodes z¯ to obtain the
encoding x of v∗. One may not be able to feed z¯ directly to the decoding algorithm Dec of code(d,m, ζ)
since z¯ will not, in general, be a vertex of the hypercube {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m. Instead, the server first rounds
the aggregated signal z¯ to the nearest point y in the hypercube before running Dec. We argue that the
combination of noise from randomization and the rounding step produces a vector y that is sufficiently
close to x with high probability.
Algorithm 4 precisely describes our construction for the promise problem. The protocol is computa-
tionally efficient, i.e., the total computational cost is poly(log(d), n) since code(d,m, ζ) = (c,Dec) runs in
time poly(log(d)) and each basic randomizer Ri runs in time O(log(d)). In fact, the computational cost at
each user does not depend on n. Also, we note that the users’ reports are succinct, namely, the report length
is O (log (log(d))) bits.
Algorithm 4 PROTPP-S-HistPP: -LDP Succinct Histogram Protocol under the Promise
Input: Users’ inputs {vi ∈ V ∪ {⊥} : i ∈ [n]}, the privacy parameter , and the confidence parameter
β > 0.
1: for Users i = 1 to n do
2: If vi 6= ⊥, then user i encodes its item: xi = c(vi). Else, user i sets xi = 0.
3: User i computes its private report: zi = Ri (xi, ).
4: User i sends zi to the server.
5: Server computes z¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi.
6: Server computes y by rounding z¯ to {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m. That is, for each j = 1, ...,m,
yj =
{
1√
m
if z¯j ≥ 0 , and
− 1√
m
otherwise,
where z¯j denotes the j-th entry of z¯.
7: Server decodes y into an estimate for the common item vˆ = Dec(y)
and computes a frequency estimate fˆ(vˆ) = 〈c(vˆ), z¯〉.
8: return
(
vˆ, fˆ(vˆ)
)
.
Theorem 3.1 (Privacy of S-HistPP). The construction of the succinct histogram S-HistPP given by Algo-
rithm 4 is -differentially private.
Proof. Privacy follows directly from the -differential privacy of the basic randomizers Ri, i ∈ [n] (Part 1
of Theorem 2.1).
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To analyze utility, we first isolate the guarantee provided by the rounding step. Let Sm = {w ∈ Rm :
‖w‖2 = 1} denote the m-dimensional unit sphere.
Lemma 3.2. Let z ∈ Sm be such that there is a codeword of code(d,m, ζ), x ∈ C, with 〈z,x〉 > 1− ζ/4.
Let y be vector in the hypercube {− 1√
m
, 1√
m
}m obtained by rounding each entry zj of z to sign(zj)/
√
m.
Then the Hamming distance between y and x is less than mζ/2, i.e.,
∑m
j=1 1(yj 6= xj) < mζ/2.
Proof. Since z and x are unit vectors, the distance ‖z− x‖2 satisfies
‖z− x‖22 = ‖z‖22 + ‖x‖22 − 2〈z,x〉 ≤ ζ/2.
The vectors x and y disagree in coordinate j only if |zj − xj | ≥ 1√m . There can be at most mζ/2 such
coordinates, since each contributes at least 1m to ‖z−x‖22. Thus, the Hamming distance between y and x is∑m
j=1 1(yj 6= xj) < mζ/2 completing the proof.
Theorem 3.3 (Error of S-HistPP under the promise). Let  > 0. Suppose that the conditions in the
above promise are true for some common item v∗ ∈ V . For any β > 0, there is a setting of η =
O
(
1

√
log(d) log(1/β)
n
)
in the promise such that, with probability at least 1−β, Protocol PROTPP-S-HistPP
publishes the right item v∗ and the frequency estimation error is bounded by
max
v∈V
|fˆ(v)− f(v)| = O
(
1

√
log(1/β)
n
)
.
Proof. Consider the conditions of the promise. Let v∗ ∈ V be the unique heavy hitter (occurring with
frequency at least η). Let β > 0. Given Lemma 3.2, to show that the protocol above recovers the correct
item v∗ with probability at least 1− β/2, it suffices to show that, with probability at least 1− β/2, we have
〈c(v∗), z¯‖z¯‖2 〉 > 1− ζ/4.
Note that the rounding step (Step 6 in Algorithm 4) would produce the same output whether it was run with
z¯ or its normalized counterpart z¯/‖z¯‖2.
By the promise, we have
z¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi =
1
n
∑
i∈T
Ri (c(v∗)) + 1
n
∑
i∈[n]\T
Ri (0)
where T denotes the set of users having the item v∗. (Note that |T |n = f(v∗) ≥ η).
First, we consider ‖z¯‖2. Since for every i ∈ [n], Ri is unbiased (Part 2 of Theorem 2.1), we have
‖E[z¯]‖2 = f(v∗). Using the triangle inequality, we get ‖z¯‖2 ≤ f(v∗) + ‖z¯ − E [z¯] ‖2. Next, we obtain
an upper bound on ‖z¯ − E [z¯] ‖2. Note that zi, i = 1, .., n, are independent and that for every i ∈ [n],
‖zi‖2 = O
(√
m

)
with probability 1. Applying McDiarmid’s inequality [19], with probability at least
1 − β/4, we have ‖z¯ − E [z¯] ‖2 ≤ O
(
1

√
m log(1/β)
n
)
. Thus, with probability at least 1 − β/4, ‖z¯‖2 is
bounded by
‖z¯‖2 ≤ f(v∗) +O
(
1

√
m log(1/β)
n
)
(3)
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Next, we consider 〈c(v∗), z¯〉. Observe that 〈c(v∗), z¯〉 =
f(v∗) +
1
n
∑
i∈T
〈c(v∗),Ri(c(v∗))− c(v∗)〉+ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]\T
〈c(v∗),Ri(0)〉
By the tail properties of the distribution of the second and third terms (following Claim 2.6), we can show
that with probability at least 1− β/4, we have
〈c(v∗), z¯〉 ≥ f(v∗)−O
(
1

√
log(1/β)
n
)
(4)
Putting (3) and (4) together, then, with probability at least 1− β/2, we have
〈c(v∗), z¯‖z¯‖2 〉 ≥
η −O
(
1

√
log(1/β)
n
)
η +O
(
1

√
m log(1/β)
n
)
where we use the fact that η ≤ f(v∗) and assume that the numerator in the right-hand side is positive.
Sincem = O(log(d)), then there is a constantαζ that depends on ζ such that if we set η = αζ 1
√
log(d) log(1/β)
n ,
then the above ratio is greater than 1−ζ/4. This proves that there is a setting of η = O
(
1

√
log(d) log(1/β)
n
)
such that construction PROTPP-S-HistPP outputs vˆ = v with probability at least 1− β/2.
Now, conditioned on correct decoding, for all v 6= v∗, the estimate fˆ(v) is implicitly assumed to be zero
(which is perfectly accurate in this case). Thus, it remains to inspect fˆ(v∗). Observe that
|fˆ(v∗)− f(v∗)| =
∣∣∣∣〈c(v∗), z¯‖z¯‖2 〉 − f(v∗)
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i∈T
〈c(v∗),Ri(c(v∗))− c(v∗)〉
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈[n]\T
〈c(v∗),Ri(0)〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Again, by the tail properties of the sums above, with probability at least 1 − β2 , we conclude that |fˆ(v∗) −
f(v∗)| ≤ O
(
1

√
log(2/β)
n
)
.
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − β, protocol PROTPP-S-HistPP recovers the correct common
item v∗ and the estimation error that is bounded by O
(
1

√
log(1/β)
n
)
.
3.2 Efficient Construction for the General Problem
In this section, we provide an efficient construction of private succinct histograms for the general setting
of the problem using the two protocols discussed in the previous sections as sub-protocols. Namely, our
construction uses an efficient private frequency oracle like FO given in Section 2.2 and an efficient private
succinct histogram for the promise problem like S-HistPP given in Section 3.1. Our construction is mod-
ular and does not depend on the internal structure of the construction protocols or the data structure. Our
construction is efficient and succinct as long as the construction of such objects is efficient and succinct.
Moreover, our succinct histogram is shown to be error-optimal if the aforementioned objects satisfy the
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guarantees of Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 (for the frequency oracle) and Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 (for the succinct
histogram under the promise).
In the promise problem, the main advantage was the lack of interference from the users who do not
hold the heavy hitter v∗ in question. The main idea here is to obtain a reduction in which we create the
conditions of the promise problem separately for each heavy hitter v∗ ∈ V such that the extra computational
cost is at most a small poly(n) factor. To do this, we hash each item v ∈ V into one of K separate parallel
channels such that users holding the same item will transmit their reports in the same channel. Each user,
in the remaining K − 1 channels, will simulate an “idle” user with item ⊥ as in the promise problem. By
choosing K sufficiently large, and repeating the protocol in parallel for T times3, we can guarantee that,
with high probability, every heavy hitter v∗ ∈ V gets assigned to an interference-free channel. Hence, by
using an error-optimal construction for the promise problem like S-HistPP in each one of these channels, we
eventually obtain a list of at most KT items such that, with high probability, all the heavy hitters will be on
that list. However, this list may also contain other erroneously decoded items due to hash collisions and we
do not know which items on the list are the heavy hitters. To overcome this, in a separate parallel channel of
the protocol, we run a frequency oracle protocol (like PROT-FO) and use the resulting frequency oracle to
estimate the frequencies of all the items on that list, then output all the items whose estimated frequencies
are above η together with their estimated frequencies.
For the purpose of this construction, it suffices to use a pairwise independent hash function. A family of
functionsH = {hs|hs : V → [K], s ∈ {0, 1}`} is said to be pairwise independent if for any distinct pair v 6=
v′ ∈ V and any values j, k ∈ [K], a uniformly sampled member of such a family hs, s ← {0, 1}`, satisfies
both hs(v) = j and hs(v′) = k simultaneously with probability 1K2 . There are efficient constructions of
pairwise independent hash families with seed length ` = O (max (log(d), log(K))). In our construction, we
can use any instance of such a family as long as it is efficient. Our hash family (or simply hash) is denoted
by Hash that, for a given input seed s and an item v ∈ V , returns a number in [K]. All users and the server
are assumed to have access to Hash. Moreover, we use a source of public randomness RndGen that, on an
input integer ` > 0, generates a random uniform string from {0, 1}` that is seen by everyone4.
The parameters of our hash family are K = n3/2 and ` = O (max (log(d), log(n))). Our construction
protocol PROT-S-Hist is given by Algorithm 5 below.
It is not hard to see that the total computational cost of this construction is
O
(
n3/2 log(1/β)costPP + costFO + ncostAFO
)
where costPP, costFO, and costAFO are the computational costs of the promise problem sub-protocol, the
frequency oracle sub-protocol, and the algorithm that computes a given frequency estimate, respectively.
Hence, for our choice of the sub-protocols above, one can easily verify the overall worst case cost of our
construction O(n5/2poly(log(d)) log(1/β)).
The report length of each user is now scaled by KT compared to that of the promise problem, that is,
O
(
n3/2 log(1/β) log (log(d))
)
. In the next section, we will discuss an approach that gets it down to 1 bit at
the expense of increasing the public coins.
Our construction here relies on public randomness represented by the T fresh random strings (seeds)
of each of length 2 max (log(d), log(n)) which for the setting we consider5 is O(log(d)). Hence, the total
number of public coins needed is O (log(1/β) log(d)).
3That is, the total number of parallel channels is KT . In each group of K channels, a fresh hash seed is used.
4We may also think of RndGen as being run at the server which then announces the resulting random string to all the users.
5We assume d n for our definitions of computational efficiency and succinctness to be meaningful.
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Algorithm 5 PROT-S-Hist: -LDP Efficient Protocol for Succinct Histograms
Input: Users’ inputs {vi ∈ V ∪ {⊥} : i ∈ [n]}, the privacy parameter , and the confidence parameter
β > 0.
1: LIST ← ∅ (initialize list of heavy hitters to the empty set.)
2: `← 2 max (log(d), log(n)) ; K ← n3/2.
3: T ← dlog(3/β)e
4: for t = 1 to T do
5: st ← RndGen(`).
6: for Channels k = 1 to K do
7: for Users i = 1 to n do
8: If Hash(st, vi) 6= k, set v′i ← ⊥. Else, set v′i ← vi
9: vˆ ← PROTPP-S-HistPP
(
{v′1, ..., v′n} ; 2T+1 ; β3d
)
{i.e., run PROTPP-S-HistPP on the modified set
of users’ items to obtain an estimate vˆ of the possibly unique item transmitted in the k-th channel.}
10: If vˆ /∈ LIST, then add vˆ to LIST.
11: FO← PROT-FO
(
{v1, ..., vn} ; 2T+1 ; β/3
)
{i.e., run PROT-FO on the original set of users’ items to
obtain the frequency oracle FO. }
12: for vˆ ∈ LIST do
13: fˆ(vˆ)← AFO (FO, vˆ). {AFO is the frequency estimator given in Section 2.2.}
14: If fˆ(vˆ) < 2T+1
√
log(d) log(1/β)
n , remove vˆ from LIST.
15: return
{(
v, fˆ (v)
)
: v ∈ LIST
}
.
Theorem 3.4 (Privacy of PROT-S-Hist). Protocol PROT-S-Hist given by Algorithm 5 is -differentially
private.
Proof. First, observe that Protocol PROT-S-Hist runs Protocol PROTPP-S-HistPP over KT channels and
runs Protocol PROT-FO once over a separate channel. In the first KT channels, for any fixed sequence of
the values of the seed of the hash function, the reports of each user over these channels are independent.
Moreover, each user gets assigned to exactly T channels. Fix any user i and any two items vi, v′i ∈ V .
Using these observations, one can see that, for any fixed sequence of values of the seed of the hash over
these KT channels, the distribution of the report of user i when its item is vi differs from the distribution
when the user’s item is v′i in at most 2T channels, and in each of these channels, the ratio between the two
distributions is at most e

2T+1 by the differential privacy of PROTPP-S-HistPP (note that the input privacy
parameter to in Step 9 is e

2T+1 ). Hence, by independence of the user’s reports over separate channels, the
corresponding ratio over all the KT channels is at most e
2T
2T+1 . In the separate channel for the frequency
oracle protocol, again by the differential privacy of PROT-FO, this ratio is bounded by e

2T+1 . Putting this
together with the argument in the previous paragraph completes the proof.
Theorem 3.5 (Error of PROT-S-Hist). For any set of users’ items {v1, ..., vn} and any β > 0, there is
a number η = O
(
log
3
2 (1/β)

√
log(d)
n
)
such that, with probability at least 1 − β, Protocol PROT-S-Hist
outputs
{(
v, fˆ (v)
)
: v ∈ LIST
}
where LIST = {v∗ ∈ V : f(v∗) ≥ η} (i.e., a list of all items whose
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frequencies are greater than η), and the error in the frequency estimates satisfies
max
v∈V
|fˆ(v)− f(v)| = O
(
log
3
2 (1/β)

√
log(d)
n
)
.
(As mentioned before, the frequency estimates of items v /∈ LIST are implicitly zero.)
Proof. Let U denote the set of the users’ items {v1, ..., vn}. We first show that for the setting of K and T
in Algorithm 5, running PROTPP-S-HistPP over KT channels will isolate every heavy hitter (i.e., every
item occurring with frequency at least η) in at least one channel without interference from other items. Let
Heavhit = {v∗ ∈ V : f(v∗) ≥ η} denote the set of the heavy hitters. Note that |Heavhit| ≤ 1η .
Claim 3.6. If η ≥ 2T+1
√
log(d) log(1/β)
n , then with probability at least 1 − β/3 (over the sequence of the
seed values s1, ..., sT of Hash), for every heavy hitter v∗ ∈ Heavhit there is t ∈ [T ] such that Hash(st, v∗) 6=
Hash(st, v) for all v ∈ U \ {v∗}.
First, we prove this claim. Fix v∗ ∈ Heavhit. Let t ∈ [T ]. Let Collst(v∗) , |{i ∈ [n] : Hash(s, v∗) =
Hash(s, vi), vi 6= v∗}| denote the number of collisions between v∗ and users’ items that are different from
v∗ when the hash seed is st. First, we bound the expected number of such collisions:
E[Collst(v∗)] ≤
∑
i:vi 6=v∗
1
K
≤ n
K
=
1√
n
Hence, by Markov’s inequality, with probability at least 1− 1√
n
, Collst(v
∗) = 0. Hence, with probability at
least 1− 1η
(
1√
n
)T ≥ 1− β/3, for each v∗ ∈ Heavhit, there exists t ∈ [T ] such that Collst(v∗) = 0, which
proves the claim.
This implies that with probability at least 1− β/3, there is a setW ⊂ [KT ] of “good” channels whose
size is the same as the number of heavy hitters such that each heavy hitter v∗ ∈ Heavhit is hashed into one
of these channels without collisions. Conditioned on this event, let w ∈ W and let v∗w denote the heavy
hitter in channel w. By Theorem 3.3, running Protocol PROTPP-S-HistPP over channel w yields the correct
estimate of v∗w with probability at least 1 − β3d (Step 9 of Algorithm 5). Hence, with probability at least
1 − β/3, all estimates of PROTPP-S-HistPP in all channels in W are correct. Hence, at this point, with
probability at least 1 − 2β3 , LIST contains all the heavy hitters in Heavhit among other possibly unreliable
estimates of PROTPP-S-HistPP for the channels in [KT ] \W .
Now, conditioned on the event above, by the error guarantee of FO given by Theorem 2.5, with proba-
bility at least 1 − β/3, the maximum error in the frequency estimates of all the items in LIST (Step 13 of
Algorithm 5), denoted by ERR (LIST), is
O
(
2T + 1

√
log(d/β)
n
)
= O
(
log(1/β)

√
log(d/β)
n
)
.
Hence, all those items in LIST with actual frequencies greater than
η , 2T + 1

√
log(d) log(1/β)
n
+ ERR (LIST) = O
(
log
3
2 (1/β)

√
log(d)
n
)
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will be kept in LIST whereas all those items with frequency less than η will be removed. Note that the
frequency estimates that are implicitly assumed to be zero of those items that are not on the list cannot have
error greater than η since their actual frequencies are less than η. This completes the proof.
4 The Full Protocol
4.1 Generic Protocol with 1-Bit Reports
In this section, we give a generic approach that transforms any private protocol in the distributed setting
(not necessarily for frequency estimation or succinct histograms) to a private distributed protocol where the
report of each user is a single bit at the expense of adding to the overall original public randomness a number
of bits that is O(nτ) where τ is the length of each user’s report in the original protocol. As mentioned in the
introduction, the transformation is a modification of the general compression technique of McGregor et al.
[20].
Consider a generic private distributed protocol GenPROT in which n users are communicating with an
untrusted server. For any n ∈ N, the protocol follows the following general steps. As before, each user
i ∈ [v] has a data point vi that lives in some finite set V = [d]. Let Qi : V ∪ {⊥} → Z be any -local
randomizer of user i ∈ [n]. We assume, w.l.o.g., that Qi may also take a special symbol ⊥ as an input.
Each user runs its -local randomizer Qi on its input data vi (and any public randomness in the protocol, if
any) and outputs a report zi. For simplicity, each report zi is assumed to be a binary string of length τ . Let
stat : Vn → C be some statistic that the server wishes to estimate where C is some bounded subset of Rk
for some integer k > 0. The server collects the reports {zi : i ∈ [n]} and runs some algorithm Astat on the
users’ reports (and the public randomness) and outputs an estimate ŝtat ∈ C of stat (v1, ..., vn).
We now give a generic construction 1-Bit-GenPROT for protocol GenPROT where each user’s report
is one bit (See Algorithm 6 below).
Algorithm 6 1-Bit-PROT: -LDP Generic 1-Bit Protocol
Input: Users’ inputs {vi ∈ V : i ∈ [n]} and a privacy parameter  ≤ ln(2).
1: Generate n independent public strings y1 ← Q1(⊥), ..., yn ← Qn(⊥).
2: for Users i = 1 to n do
3: Compute pi = 12
Pr[Qi(vi)=yi]
Pr[Qi(⊥)=yi] .
4: Sample a bit bi from Bernoulli(pi) and sends it to the server.
5: Reports← ∅. {Server initialize the set of collected reports.}
6: for i = 1 to n do
7: Server checks if bi = 1, add yi to Reports.
8: ŝtat ← Astat (Reports) . {Run algorithm Astat on the collected reports to obtain an estimate of the
desired statistic as described in the original protocol GenPROT.}
9: return ŝtat.
Note also that the only additional computational cost in this generic transformation is in Step 3. If
computing these probabilities can be done efficiently, then this transformation preserves the computational
efficiency of the original protocol.
Theorem 4.1 (Privacy of 1-Bit-PROT). Protocol 1-Bit-PROT given by Algorithm 6 is -LDP.
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Proof. Consider the output bit bi of any user i ∈ [n]. First, note that pi (in Step 3) is a valid probability since
for any item vi ∈ V , the right-hand side of Step 3 is at most e2 by -differential privacy of Qi, and since
 ≤ ln(2), pi ≤ 1. For any v ∈ V and any public string yi, let pi(v, yi) denote the conditional probability
that bi = 1 given that Qi(⊥) = yi when the item of user i is v. Let v, v′ ∈ V be any two items. It is easy to
see that pi(v,yi)pi(v′,yi) =
Pr[Qi(v)=yi]
Pr[Qi(v′)=yi] which lies in [e
−, e] by -differential privacy of Qi. One can also verify
that 1−pi(v,yi)1−pi(v′,yi) also lies in [e
−, e].
One important feature in the construction above is that the conditional distribution of the public string
yi given that bi = 1 is exactly the same as the distribution of Qi(vi), i.e., Pr [Qi(⊥) = yi| bi = 1] =
Pr [Qi(vi) = yi], and hence, upon receiving a bit bi = 1 from user i, the server’s view of yi is the same
as its view of an actual report zi ← Qi(vi) as it was the case in the original protocol.
We note that the probability that a user i ∈ [n] accepts (sets bi = 1) taken over the randomness of yi is
1
2
∑
y
Pr [Qi (vi) = y]
Pr [Qi(⊥) = y] · Pr [Qi(⊥) = y] =
1
2
.
Key statement: The two facts above show that our protocol is functionally equivalent to: first, sampling a
subset of the users where each user is sampled independently with probability 1/2, then running the original
protocol GenPROT on the sample. Thus, if the original protocol is resilient to sampling, meaning that its
error performance (with respect to some notion of error) is not essentially affected by this sampling step,
then the generic transformation given by Algorithm 6 will have essentially the same error performance.
We now formalize this statement. Let ψ : C × C → [0,∞] be some notion of error (not necessarily a
metric) between any two points in C. For any given set of users’ data {v1, ..., vn}, the error of the protocol
GenPROT is defined as
Eψ (stat; GenPROT (v1, ..., vn)) , ψ
(
stat(v1, ..., vn), ŝtat
)
(5)
Let Samp be a random sampling procedure that takes any set of users’ data {v1, ..., vn} and constructs
a set S by sampling each point vi, i ∈ [n] independently with probability 1/2. We say that GenPROT is
sampling-resilient in estimating stat with respect to ψ if for any set of users’ data (v1, ..., vn) ∈ Vn and any
β > 0, whenever
Eψ (stat; GenPROT (v1, ..., vn)) = O (g (n, d, k, ))
for some non-negative function g with probability at least 1− β over all the randomness in GenPROT, then
Eψ (stat; GenPROT (Samp (v1, ..., vn))) = O (g (n, d, k, ))
with probability at least 1− 2β over all the randomness in GenPROT and Samp.
Theorem 4.2 (Characterization of error under sampling-resilience). Suppose that for any set of users’ data
and any β > 0, the original protocol GenPROT has error (with respect to ψ) that is bounded by some
non-negative number g = g(n, d, k, ) with probability at least 1− β over the randomness in GenPROT. If
GenPROT is sampling-resilient in estimating stat with respect to ψ, then construction 1-Bit-PROT yields
error (with respect to ψ) that is O (g(n, d, k, )).
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4.2 Efficient Construction of Succinct Histograms with 1-Bit Reports
We now apply the generic transformation discussed above to our efficient protocol PROT-S-Hist (Algo-
rithm 5) to obtain an efficient private protocol for succinct histograms with 1-bit reports and optimal error.
Computational efficiency: To show that the protocol remains efficient after this transformation, we argue
that the probabilities in Step 3 of Algorithm 6 can be computed efficiently in our case. The overall -
local randomizer QFulli at each user i over all the KT + 1 parallel channels in PROT-S-Hist is described
in Algorithm 7. Note that given the user’s item vi and the seed of the hash, the KT + 1 components of
QFulli (vi) are independent. Moreover, note that (K − 1)T of these components have the same (uniform)
distribution since each user gets assigned by the hash function to only T + 1 channels and in the remainder
channels the user’s report is uniformly random. Hence, to execute Step 3 of Algorithm 6, each user in
our case only needs to compute T + 1 probabilities out of the total KT + 1 components. This is easy
because of the way the basic randomizer R works. To see this, first note that each yi (referring to the
public string yi in Algorithm 6) is now a sequence of (index, bit) pairs: (j1, bj1) , . . . ,
(
jKT+1, bjKT+1
)
.
To compute the probability corresponding to one of the T + 1 item-dependent components of QFulli (vi),
each user first locates in the public string yi the pair (j, b) corresponding to this component. Then, it
compares the sign of the j-th bit of the encoding6 of its item vi with the sign of b. If signs are equal,
then the desired probability is e

1+e , otherwise it is
1
1+e . Hence, the computational cost of this step (per
user) is O (T log (mPP) + log (mFO)) = O(log (log(d)) log(1/β) + log(n)) where mPP is the length of
the encoding c(vi) used in the promise problem protocol PROTPP-S-HistPP and mFO is the length of the
encoding φvi used in the frequency oracle protocol PROT-FO. Thus, at worst the overall computational
cost of the 1-Bit protocol is the same as that of protocol PROT-S-Hist.
Algorithm 7 QFulli : -Local Randomizer of User i in PROT-S-Hist (Algorithm5)
Input: item vi ∈ V , privacy parameter , seeds of Hash s1, ..., sT .
1: for t = 1 to T do
2: for Channels k = 1 to K do
3: If Hash(st, vi) 6= k, set z(t,k)i = Ri (0, ). Else, set z(t,k)i = Ri (c (vi) , ). { z(t,k)i denotes the
report of user i in the k-th channel in the t-th group.}
4: Set z(fo)i = Ri (φvi , ). {φvi is the vi-th column of Φ the encoding matrix in the construction of the
frequency oracle FO.}
5: return zi =
(
z
(t,k)
i , z
(fo)
i : t = 1, ..., T ; k = 1, ...,K
)
.
Our 1-Bit Protocol gives the same privacy and error guarantees of PROT-S-Hist.
Theorem 4.3 (Privacy of the 1-Bit Protocol for Succinct Histograms). The 1-Bit Protocol for succinct
histograms is -differentially private.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorems 3.2 and 4.1.
Theorem 4.4 (Error of the 1-Bit Protocol for Succinct Histograms). The 1-Bit Protocol for succinct his-
tograms provides the same guarantees of Protocol PROT-S-Hist given in Theorem 3.2.
6This encoding is either c(vi) or φvi depending on whether we are at Step 3 or Step 4 of Algorithm 7.
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Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that Protocol PROT-S-Hist is sampling-resilient.
Note that for any β > 0, any n, and any set of users’ items {v1, ..., vn}, PROT-S-Hist satisfies the error
guarantees of Theorem 4.1 with probability at least 1− β. Thus, sampling a subset of users’ items (where
each item is picked with probability 1/2), then feeding this set to PROT-S-Hist will only lead to an extra
error term of O(1/
√
n) which will be swamped by the original error term of O
(√
log(d)
n
)
.
5 Tight Lower Bound on the Error
In this section, we provide a lower bound of Ω
(
1

√
log(d)
n
)
on the error of frequency oracles and succinct
histograms under the (, δ)-local privacy constraint. Our lower bound is the same for pure  as for (, δ)-
LDP algorithms when δ = o
(
1
n log(n)
)
. Namely, our lower bound shows that there is no advantage of
(, δ) algorithms over pure  algorithms in terms of asymptotic error for all meaningful settings of δ. In fact,
it is standard to assume that δ = o( 1n), say δ ≈ 1nγ , γ ≥ 2, since otherwise there are trivial examples of
algorithms that are clearly non-private yet they satisfy the definition (, δ) differential privacy (for example,
see [6, Example 2]).
Our lower bound matches the upper bound (for both frequency oracles and succinct histograms) dis-
cussed in previous sections. Hence, the efficient constructions given in Sections 2.2, 3, and 4.2 yield the
optimal error. Our lower bound also shows that some previous constructions yield the optimal error, namely,
the constructions of [14] and [21]. However, as discussed in Section 2, those constructions are computation-
ally inefficient when used directly to construct succinct histograms.
Our Technique: Our approach is inspired by the techniques used by Duchi et al. [3] to obtain lower bounds
on the statistical minimax rate (expected worst-case error) of multinomial estimation in the pure  local
model. In a scenario where the item of each user is drawn independently from an unknown distribution
on V , we first derive a lower bound on the expected worst-case error (the minimax rate) in estimating the
right distribution. We then show using standard concentration bounds that this implies a lower bound on
the maximum error in estimating the actual frequencies of all the items in V . To obtain a lower bound
on the minimax rate, we first define the notion of an η-degrading channel which is a noise operator that,
given a user’s item as input, outputs the same item with probability η, and outputs a uniform random item
from V otherwise. We compare two scenarios: in the first scenario, each user feeds its item first to an η-
degrading channel, then feeds its output into its (, δ) local randomizer to generate a report, whereas the
second scenario is the normal scenario where the user feeds its item directly into its local randomizer. We
then argue that a lower bound of Ω(1) on the minimax error in the first scenario implies a lower bound of
Ω(η) in the second scenario. Next, we show that a lower bound of Ω(1) is true in the first scenario with
an η-degrading channel when η = Ω
(
1

√
log(d)
n
)
, which gives us the desired lower bound. To derive
the Ω(1) lower bound in the first scenario, we proceed as follows. First, we derive an upper bound of
O
(
2 + δ log(d/δ)
)
on the mutual information between a uniform random item V from V and the output
of an (, δ)-local randomizer with input V . Then, we prove that the application of an η-degrading channel
on a user’s item amplifies privacy, namely, scales down both  and δ by η. This implies that in the first
scenario above with an η-degrading channel, the mutual information between a uniform item from V and
the output of the (, δ)-local randomizer is O
(
η22 + δ log(d/δ)
)
. We use such mutual information bound
together with Fano’s inequality to show that for η = Ω
(
1

√
log(d)
n
)
, the error in the first scenario is Ω(1).
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5.1 A Minimax Formulation
Notation and definitions: Let simplex(d) ⊂ [0, 1]d denote the probability simplex of d corner points. Let
P ∈ simplex(d) be some probability distribution over the item set V = [d]7 . Users’ items vi, i ∈ [n] are
assumed to be drawn independently from the distribution P . For every i ∈ [n], let Qi : V → Z be any
(, δ)-local differentially private algorithm ((, δ)-local randomizer) used to generate a report zi ∈ Z of user
i where Z is some arbitrary fixed set. All Qi, i ∈ [n] use independent randomness. Hence, all zi, i ∈ [n]
are independent (but not necessarily identically distributed). Let A : Zn → [0, 1]d be an algorithm for
estimating P based on the observations z1, ..., zn. Let Pˆ ∈ [0, 1]d denote the output ofA. The expected L∞
estimation error for a given input distribution P and an estimation algorithm A is defined as
E(P;A) , E [‖A(z1, ..., zn)− P‖∞] = E
[
max
v∈[d]
|Pˆv − Pv|
]
where the expectation is taken over the distribution P , the randomness of Qi, i ∈ [n], and randomness (if
any) of A.
The minimax error (minimax rate) is defined as the minimum (over all estimators A) of the maximum
(over all distributions P ∈ simplex(d)) error defined above. That is,
MinMaxError , min
A
max
P∈simplex(d)
E(P,A). (6)
Let B : Zn → [0, 1]d be an algorithm for estimating the frequency vector f = 1n
∑n
i=1 evi of the items in V
where ev is the v-th standard basis vector in Rd. Let fˆ ∈ [0, 1]d denote the output of B. The error incurred
by B is given in Section 1, that is,
ERR(f ;B) = ‖fˆ − f‖∞ = max
v∈[d]
|fˆ(v)− f(v)|. (7)
We first provide a lower bound of Ω
(
1

√
log(d)
n
)
on (6) and argue using Hoeffding’s bound that this
implies a lower bound of the same asymptotic order on the expectation of (7) which clearly proves our main
result in this section.
Lemma 5.1. For any  = O(1) and 0 ≤ δ ≤ o
(
1
n log(n)
)
. For any sequence Qi, i ∈ [n] of (, δ)-LDP
algorithms, the minimax rate satisfies
MinMaxError = Ω
(
min
(
1

√
log(d)
n
, 1
))
where MinMaxError is defined in (6).
The above lemma is the central technical part of this section. The proof of this lemma is given separately
in Section 5.3. First, we formally state and prove our lower bound in the following section.
7Without loss of generality, we will use V and [d] interchangeably to denote the item set
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5.2 Main Result
Theorem 5.2 (Lower Bound on the Error of Private Histograms). For any  = O(1) and 0 ≤ δ ≤
o
(
1
n log(n)
)
. For any sequence Qi : V → Z, i ∈ [n] of (, δ)-LDP algorithms, and for any algorithm
B : Zn → [0, 1]d, there exists a distribution P ∈ simplex(d) (from which vi, i ∈ [n] are sampled in i.i.d.
fashion) such that the expected error with respect to such P is
E [ERR(f ;B)] = Ω
(
min
(
1

√
log(d)
n
, 1
))
where ERR(f ;B) is defined in (7).
Proof. First, note that for the case where n < log(d)
2
, the above theorem follows directly from Lemma 5.1
since (as given in the proof of this lemma in Section 5.3) our example distribution P will simply be a
degenrate distribution and hence f = P with probability 1.
Turning to the case where n > log(d)
2
, having Lemma 5.1 in hand, the proof of Theorem 5.2 in this case
becomes a simple application of Hoeffding’s inequality. First, fix , δ as in the theorem statement and let
Qi : V → Z, i ∈ [n] of (, δ)-LDP mechanisms. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an
algorithm B : Zn → [0, 1]d such that for any distribution P ∈ simplex(d) from which the users’ items
v1, ..., vn are sampled in i.i.d. fashion, the error E [ERR(f ;B)] 6= Ω
(
1

√
log(d)
n
)
. Let fˆ denote the output
of B. Now, observe that for sufficiently large n and d, we have
E(P;B) = E
[
‖fˆ − P‖∞
]
≤ E
[
‖fˆ − f‖∞
]
+ E [‖f − P‖∞] ≤ E [ERR(f ;B)] +
√
3
2
√
log(d)
n
(8)
where the last inequality in (8) follows from using Hoeffding’s inequality and the fact that
E [‖f − P‖∞] =
∞∫
t=0
Pr [‖f − P‖∞ ≥ t] dt.
Hence, E(P;B) 6= Ω
(√
log(d)
2n
)
. However, this contradicts Lemma 5.1. Therefore, the proof is complete.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 5.1
We first introduce the notion of an η-degrading channel. For any η ∈ [0, 1], an η-degrading channel W(η) :
V → V is a randomized mapping that is defined as follows: for every v ∈ V ,
W(η)(v) =
{
v with probability η
U, with probability 1− η (9)
where U is a uniform random variable over V .
Let MinMaxErrorη be the minimax error resulting from the scenario where each user i ∈ [n] with item
vi ∈ V , first, apply vi to an independent copy W(η)i of an η-degrading channel, then apply the output to its
(, δ)-LDP randomizer Qi that outputs the report zi. That is, MinMaxErrorη is the minimax error when
Qi(·) is replaced with Qi
(
W
(η)
i (·)
)
, i ∈ [n]. Our proof relies on the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.3. Let η ∈ [0, 1]. If MinMaxError ≤ η10 , then MinMaxErrorη ≤ 110 .
Proof. Suppose that MinMaxError ≤ η10 . Then, there is an algorithm A : Zn → [0, 1]d such that for any
distribution P˜ ∈ simplex(d) on V , we have
E
[
‖A (Q1(v1), ...,Qn(vn))− P˜‖∞
]
≤ η
10
(10)
where vi is drawn from P˜ independently for every i ∈ [n].
LetW(η) denote the distribution of the output of the η-degrading channel W(η). Note that if the distri-
bution of the input of W(η) is P , then
W(η) = ηP + (1− η)U (11)
where U is the uniform distribution on V .
Consider an algorithm Aη defined as follows. For any input (z1, ..., zn) ∈ Zn, Aη runs A on its input
to obtain Pˆ ∈ [0, 1]d. Then, Aη computes a vector Pˆ(η) ∈ [0, 1]d whose entries Pˆ(η)v , v ∈ [d], are given
by 1η
(
Pˆv − (1− η)U
)
rounded to [0, 1]. Now, consider the scenario where we replace each Qi(·) with
Qi
(
W(η) (·)) for all i ∈ [n]. Observe that for any distribution P of users’ items, we have
E (P,Aη) = E
[
‖Pˆ(η) − P‖∞
]
≤ E
[
‖1
η
(
Pˆ − (1− η)U
)
− P‖∞
]
=
1
η
E
[
‖Pˆ −W(η)‖∞
]
(12)
=
1
η
E
[
‖A (Q1(y1), ...,Qn(yn))−W(η)‖∞
]
≤ 1
10
(13)
where yi is drawn from W(η) independently for every i ∈ [n]. Note that the last equality in (12) follows
from (11), and (13) follows from (10).
Given Lemma 5.3, our proof proceeds as follows. We show that for a setting of η= Ω
(
min
(√
log(d)
2n
, 1
))
,
we have MinMaxErrorη > 110 which, by Lemma 5.3, implies that MinMaxError = Ω
(
min
(√
log(d)
2n
, 1
))
which will complete our proof.
We consider the following scenario. Let V be a uniform random variable on V . Conditioned on V =
v, for all i ∈ [n], vi = v, i.e., all users have the same item v when V = v. Each user i applies an
independent copy of an η-degrading channel W(η)i to its item vi. The output is then fed to the user’s (, δ)-
local randomizerQi that outputs the user’s report zi. Let G : Zn → V be an algorithm that, given the users’
reports z1, ..., zn, outputs an estimate Vˆ for the common item V .
Fano’s inequality: Let Perror(G) be the probability of error that G outputs a wrong hypothesis Vˆ 6= V . That
is,
Perror(G) = Pr [G(z1, ..., zn) 6= V ] .
Fano’s inequality gives a lower bound on the probability of error incurred by any such estimator G:
Pmin−error , minG Perror(G) ≥ 1−
I(v1, ..., vn; z1, ...zn) + 1
log(d)
(14)
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One can easily see that the minimax error MinMaxErrorη is bounded from below as
MinMaxErrorη ≥ min
v 6=v′
‖ev − ev′‖∞
2
Pmin−error = Pmin−error (15)
To reach our goal, given (14)-(15), it suffices to show that for a setting of η = Ω
(
min
(√
log(d)
2n
, 1
))
, we
have I(v1,...,vn;z1,...zn)log(d) ≤ 12 . This will be established using the following claims.
Claim 5.4. Let V be uniformly distributed over [d]. Let Q : [d] → Z be an (, δ)-LDP algorithm and let
Z denote Q(V ). Then, we have
I(V ;Z) = O
(
2 +
δ

log(d) +
δ

log(/δ)
)
.
Proof. Let Mv denote the probability density function of the output of Q(v), v ∈ [d]8. Let M¯(z) =
1
d
∑
v∈[d]
Mv(z), z ∈ Z . For every v ∈ [d], define
Bad
(1)
v ,
{
z ∈ Z : Mv(z)
M¯(z)
> e2
}
and
Bad
(2)
v ,
{
z ∈ Z : Mv(z)
M¯(z)
< e−2
}
.
Let Badv = Bad
(1)
v ∪ Bad(2)v and Bad = ∪v∈[d]
(
Bad
(1)
v ∪ Bad(2)v
)
. Let B be a binary random variable that
takes value 1 whenever Z ∈ BadV and 0 otherwise. Now, observe that
I(V ;Z) ≤ I (V ;Z,B) ≤ I (V ;Z|B) +H(B)
≤ I (V ;Z|B = 0) + I (V ;Z|B = 1) Pr [Bad] +H(B) (16)
where H(B) denotes Shannon entropy of B. The above inequalities follow from the standard properties of
the mutual information between any pair of random variables and the fact that Pr[B = 1] = Pr[Bad].
First, we consider the first term in (16). Conditioned onB = 0,Z lies in a set
{
z ∈ Z : e−2 ≤ Mv(z)
M¯(z)
≤ e2
}
.
Hence, we can obtain a bound ofO(2) on I (V ;Z|B = 0) by applying techniques that were originally used
for pure  local differential privacy like those in [3] (Corollary 1 therein).
Next, observe that I (V ;Z|B = 1) ≤ H(V ) ≤ log(d). Thus, it remains to bound Pr[Bad] (and conse-
quently bound H(B)). Observe that
Pr
[
Bad
(1)
v
]
=
∫
z∈Bad(1)v
Mv(z)dz > e
2
∫
z∈Bad(1)v
M¯(z)dz
> e
∫
z∈Bad(1)v
Mv(z)dz − eδ = e Pr
[
Bad
(1)
v
]
− eδ
8To avoid cumbersome notation, we will ignore irrelevant technicalities of the measure defined on Z as well as the distinctions
between probability mass functions and density functions and will use the notation
∫
z∈S
Mv(z)dz to simply meanPr[Z ∈ S|V = v]
whether Z is discrete or continuous random variable.
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where the last inequality above follows from the fact that Q is (, δ)-differentially private. Hence, we get
Pr
[
Bad
(1)
v
]
<
eδ
e − 1 = O(δ/).
Similarly, we can bound Pr
[
Bad
(2)
v
]
< e
−δ
e−1 = O(δ/). Hence, Pr[Bad] = O(δ/) which gives us the
required bound on the second term of 16. Finally, note that the bound on Pr[Bad] implies a bound of
O
(
δ
 log(/δ)
)
on H(B). This completes the proof.
Claim 5.5 (Privacy amplification via degrading channels). The compositionQ (W(η) (·)) of an η-degrading
channel W(η) (defined in (9)) with an (, δ)-LDP algorithm Q yields a (O(η), O(ηδ))-LDP algorithm.
Proof. Fix any measurable subset S ⊂ Z . For any v ∈ V , letM(η)v (S) denote Pr
[Q (W(η)(v)) ∈ S] and
Mv(S) denote Pr [Q(v) ∈ S]. Fix any pair v, v′ ∈ V . Observe that
M(η)v (S) = ηMv(S) + (1− η)
1
d
∑
u∈V
Mu(S)
and
M(η)v′ (S) = ηMv′(S) + (1− η)
1
d
∑
u∈V
Mu(S).
Hence, we can writeM(η)v′ (S) as
M(η)v′ (S) = η (Mv′(S)−Mv(S)) +M(η)v (S)
≤ η (e − 1)Mv(S) +M(η)v (S) + ηδ
≤ (1 + ηe (e − 1))M(η)v (S) + eηδ (17)
The last inequality follows from the fact Q is (, δ)-differentially private, hence,
Mv(S) ≤ eEy←W(η)(v) [My(S)] + δ = eM(η)v (S) + δ.
We conclude the proof by noting that 1 + ηe (e − 1) = eO(η) and eηδ = O(ηδ) since  is O(1).
Putting these claims together with the fact that I(v1, ..., vn; z1, ...zn) ≤
∑n
i=1 I(vi; zi), we reach that,
for δ = o
(
1
n log(n)
)
, we have
I(v1, ..., vn; z1, ...zn)
log(d)
= O
(
nη22
log(d)
+
1
log(n)
+
1
log(d)
)
which, by an appropriate setting of η = Ω
(
min
(√
log(d)
2n
, 1
))
, can be made smaller than 1/2. This
completes the proof of Lemma 5.1.
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